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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff does not like what a handful of third-party websites have said about him.

But this action does not seek to hold those third parties liable. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to hold
Yahoo liable for the appearance in non-paid, organic search results of those third-party links that
contain information about Plaintiff and his law firm, which Plaintiff deems objectionable.
Plaintiff’s defamation and trademark related claims are based on the fact that Yahoo has not
removed links to the third-party websites in response to Plaintiff’s demand. Plaintiff’s
defamation (and other reputation-related claims) are barred under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”), which provides complete immunity to Yahoo as an
interactive computer service provider, from claims arising out of the exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content. Plaintiff’s trademark infringement (and related claims) fail to allege that Yahoo made
any infringing “use” of his marks (other than displaying his name and the name of his law firm in
website search results), or that any members of the consuming public would be confused as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of Yahoo (or anyone else) with Plaintiff. Accordingly,
for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
II.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS AND ARGUMENT
Plaintiff alleges that he is an attorney, and self-described “quasi-celebrity,” in New York

(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9). He owns U.S. trademark registrations for his name, RAHUL MANCHANDA,
and his law firm, MANCHANDA LAW OFFICES, for use in connection with legal services
(Compl., Ex. A). This case arises out of the appearance of a handful of links to third-party
websites appearing in Yahoo’s organic search results, which Plaintiff contends contain injurious
statements about him (Compl., ¶¶ 8-9).
1
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The third-party websites alleged to contain the purported injurious statements are
ripoffreport.com, complaintsboard.com, usacomplaints.com, and nypost.com (Compl. ¶ 8; see
also Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exs. 2-6). Plaintiff does not allege that Yahoo
authored or published the content on any of the third-party websites to which the links resolve
(Compl. ¶¶ 8-9). Rather, the sole allegation as to Yahoo with respect to those sites is that Yahoo
did not remove or de-index the links to those sites in response to Plaintiff’s request (Compl. ¶ 8).
Based on that allegation, in addition to defamation and a series of other reputation-related
claims, Plaintiff also asserts a claim for trademark infringement (Compl. ¶¶ 9-11). However,
Plaintiff does not allege that Yahoo used Plaintiff’s name, trademarks, or any other terms in
sponsored ads in connection with search engine marketing, or in any other commercial or
competitive manner that would injure Plaintiff with respect to his alleged marks (see Compl. ¶¶
2-11). Rather, all of alleged wrongdoing by Yahoo is based on the allegation that Yahoo displays
the third-party websites in organic search results to people who use Yahoo’s search engine to
search for the terms “Rahul Manchanda” and “Manchanda Law Offices” (see Compl., ¶¶ 8, 9).
Based on Yahoo’s display of organic search results that Plaintiff does not like, Plaintiff’s
Complaint asserts causes of action against Yahoo for: (1) Defamation; (2) Libel; (3) Slander; (4)
Tortious Interference of Contract; (5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (6) Breach of the Duty of
Loyalty; (7) Unfair Trade Practices; (8) False Advertising; (9) Unlawful Trespass; (10) Civil
RICO; (11) Unjust Enrichment; (12) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (13) Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (14) Trademark Infringement (Compl. ¶¶ (a)-(n)).
Section 230 of the CDA provides complete immunity to Yahoo with respect to Plaintiff’s
defamation and related claims. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Specifically, the CDA immunizes
interactive computer service providers, such as Yahoo, from claims arising out of the exercise of
2
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a publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content. Under the CDA, Yahoo cannot be treated as a publisher and held liable
for the publication of, or refusal to remove, content created and published on third-party
websites. Plaintiff is well aware that his claims against Yahoo and the other search engine
defendants are barred by the CDA. In fact, he previously sought to obtain a restraining order
against defendants Microsoft and Google, seeking the same relief he seeks here, i.e., removal of
the identical Rip Off Report links from organic search results, only to be denied by a court order
holding that such relief was barred by the CDA (see RJN, Ex. 1). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
defamation and reputation-related claims against Yahoo are barred as a matter of law and must
be dismissed.1
With respect to Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim, it should be noted that as to
Yahoo that claim is limited to the allegation that Plaintiff’s marks – which consist of Plaintiff’s
name and the name of his law firm – appeared in non-paid organic search results. Plaintiff fails
to allege that Yahoo made any infringing “use” of his marks (other than displaying his name and
the name of his law firm in website search results), or that any members of the consuming public
would be confused as to the affiliation, connection, or association of Yahoo (or anyone else) with
Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim should likewise be dismissed.
Further, Plaintiff’s claims for unfair trade practices, false advertising, unjust enrichment,
tortious interference with contract and business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
the duty of loyalty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, unlawful trespass, and civil RICO all fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted for the separate and independent reasons set forth in detail below.
1

Plaintiff’s pursuit of an identical claim relating to identical content may constitute vexatious litigation, although
that point is not being raised by Yahoo since Yahoo was not a litigant in the prior action.

3
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III.

LEGAL STANDARD
“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the

complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff's favor.” Ritani, LLC v. Aghjayan, 880 F.Supp.2d 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citation omitted). But, [c]ourts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rather, to survive dismissal, a complaint must contain
“‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Biro v. Conde Nast, 807
F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. “But ‘naked assertions’ or ‘conclusory statements’ are not enough.” Biro, 807 F.3d
at 544 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); Mallgren v. Microsoft Corp., 975 F.Supp.2d 451, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action’ are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
IV.

ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs’ Defamation and Related Claims Fail Because Yahoo’s Conduct Was
Privileged Under The Communications Decency Act
Plaintiff’s defamation and related claims are the quintessential example of claims barred

as a matter of law by Section 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Yahoo is an interactive computer
service provider as defined under the CDA. As courts in New York and elsewhere have
repeatedly held, the CDA bars any cause of action that seeks to hold an interactive computer
service provider liable for either the content created by a third-party user of the service, or the
4
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service provider’s decision to allow, edit, or remove that content. Because Plaintiff’s defamation
and related claims seek to impose the exact type of liability the CDA forbids, this Court must
dismiss those claims as against Yahoo.
“Courts across the country have repeatedly held that the CDA’s grant of immunity should
be construed broadly.” Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 690, 699
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases). The broad immunity afforded by the CDA stems from the
plain language of the statute. Section 230 of the CDA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1).
Here, there can be no dispute that Yahoo is an interactive computer service provider.
Numerous courts have recognized that Yahoo, and other search engines, are interactive computer
service providers under the CDA. See, e.g., Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F.Supp.2d 577, 591
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Ask.com is an ‘interactive computer service’ because it is an internet search
engine that allows members of the public to search its directory of web pages . . . and is therefore
an ‘information service . . . that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server.’”) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)); Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Yahoo is an interactive computer service provider).
“Section 230(c) . . . immunizes internet service providers from defamation and other,
non-intellectual property . . . claims arising from third-party content.” Murawski, 514 F.Supp.2d
at 591. “‘[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter

5
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content—are barred’ by the CDA.’” Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330
(4th Cir. 1997)).
The only allegation as to Yahoo with respect to the allegedly defamatory content on the
offending third-party websites is that Yahoo refused to remove links to those sites pursuant to
Plaintiff’s request (Compl., ¶ 11). “Deciding whether or not to remove content or deciding when
to remove content falls squarely within [a search engine’s] exercise of a publisher’s traditional
role and is therefore subject to the CDA’s broad immunity.” Murawski, 514 F.Supp.2d at 591.
As to the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint other than defamation, “New York law
considers claims sounding in tort to be defamation claims where those causes of action seek
damages only for injury to reputation, or where the entire injury complained of by plaintiff flows
from the effect on his reputation.” Hengjun Chao v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 476 Fed. Appx. 892, 895
(2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to his defamation
claim, all of Plaintiff’s other causes of action – with the exception of his trademark infringement
and apparently related unfair trade practices and unjust enrichment claims – appear to seek
damages for injury to his reputation, or injuries that flow from the effect on his reputation (see
Compl., ¶¶ 2-12). Those causes of action are therefore subsumed by Plaintiff’s defamation claim,
and as such are equally barred under the CDA. See, e.g., Chao, 476 Fed. Appx. at 895 (affirming
dismissal of tortious interference and other tort claims where “the factual allegations underlying
each . . . [were] virtually identical to the facts underlying his defamation claim” and “the harms
that [plaintiff] contend[ed] he suffered as a result of these other torts [including] attorney’s fees
[and] emotional distress . . . all flow[ed] from the effect on his reputation.”); Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumer Affairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (tortious interference with
business expectancy barred under CDA); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
6
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2008) (negligence barred under CDA); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 1193, 11972001 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding fraud, breach of contract, negligence, and other statutory and
common law violations barred under CDA); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492, 501
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence liability); Noah v. AOL Time
Warner, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. 2004)
(negligence and defamation).
With that background, Yahoo asks that the following claims be dismissed with prejudice
as barred under the CDA: defamation, libel, slander, tortious interference with contract/business
relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, unlawful trespass, civil
RICO, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Trademark Infringement
Plaintiff appears to be alleging two categories of purported trademark use by the
Defendants: (1) use of Plaintiff’s marks as paid search terms in connection with for-profit search
engine marketing (see Compl. ¶¶ 2-7); and (2) use of Plaintiff’s marks in non-paid organic
search results (see Compl., ¶¶ 2-8). As to Yahoo, Plaintiff’s claim is limited to the allegation that
his marks – which consist of his name and the name of his law firm – appeared in non-paid
organic search results (Compl., ¶ 8).
To establish a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, a
plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that
(2) the defendant used the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) in connection with the sale
or advertising of goods or services, (5) without the plaintiff's consent, and (6) that
defendant's use of that mark is likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of defendant with plaintiff, or as to the origin,
7
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sponsorship, or approval of the defendant's goods, services, or commercial
activities by plaintiff.
Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, 601 F.Supp.2d 571, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 355 Fed.Appx. 508
(2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 40607 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
1. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege that Yahoo Used Plaintiff’s Marks in Any Manner
Actionable Under the Lanham Act
Rather than explain how Yahoo can be held liable for Plaintiff’s name showing up in
organic search results, Plaintiff instead states an allegation – not tied to any defendant in
particular – that “[i]nvisible metatags used to lure internet search engines using a trademark is a
‘use in commerce’ of the trademark” (Compl., ¶ 11). “[Trademark] ‘use’ must be decided as a
threshold matter because, while any number of activities may be ‘in commerce’ or create a
likelihood of confusion, no such activity is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the ‘use’ of a
trademark.” 1-800-Contacts, 414 F.3d at 412. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Yahoo
“used” any of his marks.
Although Plaintiff includes a random allegation that use of a trademark in a website’s
meta-tags can constitute a “use in commerce,” Plaintiff fails to allege that Yahoo included his
trademarks in any of the cited websites’ meta-tags. In order to be responsible for the placement
of Plaintiff’s trademarks in the meta-tags of the offending websites, Yahoo would have to own
those sites. Plaintiff has not alleged – because he cannot allege – that Yahoo owned any of the
allegedly offending third-party sites. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Yahoo made
the requisite “use” of his purported marks.

8
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2. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Likelihood of Confusion
Even if Yahoo did own the offending third-party websites and “use” the Plaintiff’s marks
in the meta-tags contained therein – which it did not – the Complaint fails to plausibly allege any
likelihood of confusion. Where, as here, the allegation is that consumers will be diverted to
websites other than Plaintiff’s (see Compl., ¶¶ 8, 9, 11), the argument is based on initial interest
confusion.
“Initial interest confusion arises when a consumer who searches for the plaintiff’s website
with the aid of a search engine is directed instead to the defendant’s site because of a similarity
in the parties’ website address.” Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462, n. 13 (2d Cir.
2004). “[T]he concern is that potential customers of one website will be diverted and distracted
to a competing website.” Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 450, 465 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (citation omitted). “The harm is that the potential customer believes that the competing
website is associated with the website the customer was originally searching for and will not
resume searching for the original website.” Bihari v. Gross, 119 F.Supp.2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
Where the alleged infringer does not compete with the plaintiff or it is otherwise obvious
that no consumer would be confused by the allegedly infringing use, no likelihood of confusion
can be found. See, e.g., Whitney Inf. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, No. 2:04-CV-47-FTM33-SPC, 2005 WL 1677256, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2005) (reversed on other grounds)
(dismissing real estate investment course company’s trademark infringement and false
designation of origin claims against “ripoffreport.com” because no consumer would “be
confused by a consumer watch-dog type website that is not selling any real estate investment
course”); MCW, Inc. v. BadBusinessBureau.Com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL
9
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833595, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (dismissing Lanham Act claims against
“ripoffreport.com” and “badbusinessbureau.com” for using plaintiff's trademarks in connection
with allegedly defamatory posts dismissed because no “reasonable viewer of the defendants’
website would believe that the disparaging comments regarding [plaintiff’s] business are
endorsed by [plaintiff].”); c.f. Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding “no possibility of confusion and no Lanham Act violation” because use of the word
“sucks” in “‘taubmansucks.com’ removes any confusion as to source.”); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of
Am. V. Benfield, 507 F.Supp.2d 832, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (TaylorHomes-Ripoff.com not
confusing as a matter of law because “[n]o one seeking Taylor’s website would think—even
momentarily—that Taylor in fact sponsored a website that included the word ‘ripoff’ in its
website address.”); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1163 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (finding no trademark infringement as a matter of law because “[n]o reasonable
consumer comparing Bally’s official web site with” compupix.com/ballysucks would be
confused); Ascentive, 842 F.Supp.2d at 463 (finding no likelihood of confusion because “no
reasonable visitor to Ascentive.PissedConsumer.com or Dormia.PissedConsumer.com would
assume the sites to be affiliated with [plaintiffs].”); Bihari, 119 F.Supp.2d at 319 (no likelihood
of confusion because “no reasonable viewer would believe that the disparaging comments
regarding [plaintiff’s] business ethics . . . are endorsed by [plaintiff].”). Here, none of the
websites identified in the Complaint compete with Plaintiff. Additionally, it is obvious from the
domain alone that a reasonable viewer would not believe that ripoffreport.com,
complaintsboard.com, and usacomplaints.com are endorsed by Plaintiff. Likewise, the article
title in the nypost.com link speaks for itself: http://nypost.com/2015/06/01/ woman-says-manfrom-sugar-daddy-site-threatened-to-kill-her/.
10

Case
Case1:16-cv-03350-JPO
1:16-cv-03350-JPO Document
Document20-1
29 Filed
Filed05/18/16
05/12/16 Page
Page17
17ofof26
26

Moreover, no reasonable consumer would be confused because the third-party websites
identified all use Plaintiff’s marks for the sole purpose of accurately identifying Plaintiff. See
Cintas, 601 F.Supp.2d at 579 (“There is no justification for relief under Section 1114 and
1125(a), when ‘the defendants use plaintiff's mark not in a manner that would create confusion
as to the source, but rather as part of a message whose meaning depends on reference to
plaintiff's product.’ While the materials available on Defendants’ websites may disparage
[plaintiff], the likelihood that [plaintiff’s] actual or potential consumers would be confused about
who provides [plaintiff’s] goods and services is remote.”) (quoting United We Stand Am., Inc. v.
United We Stand Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)). Therefore, this is no
justification for Plaintiff’s claims where one website contains a news article about the Plaintiff,
and the remaining websites contain consumer complaints about Plaintiff and his law firm.
Under the case law cited above, the use of Plaintiff’s marks – which consist of his name
and the name of his law firm – on the identified websites are not of a type that would ever lead a
consumer to be confused as to source, affiliation, or sponsorship by Plaintiff. For the foregoing
reasons, Plaintiff’s claim for trademark infringement as against defendant Yahoo should be
dismissed.
C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Unfair Trade Practices and False Advertising
New York’s deceptive practices and false advertising law is codified in New York
General Business Law Sections 349 and 350. Section 349 prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this
state.” Section 350 prohibits “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state.”

11
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To recover under section 349, a “plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the
challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material
way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.” New World
Solutions, Inc. v. NameMedia, Inc., ---F. Supp.3d---, 2015 WL 8958390, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
15, 2015) (citations omitted). The standard for recovery under Section 350 is identical to that
under Section 349. Id. at *25.
Although not explicitly stated in the text of either provision, courts have consistently
found that the gravamen of a section 349 or 350 claim is consumer injury or harm to the public
interest. Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995). “[C]laims
involving trademark violations are not cognizable under N.Y. GBL §§ 349 or 350 unless there is
a specific and substantial injury to the public interest over and above ordinary trademark
infringement or dilution.” New World Solutions, 2015 WL 8958390, at *26 (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege – because he cannot allege – the existence of any consumer
injury or harm to the public as a result of any conduct by defendant Yahoo, because Plaintiff’s
claim is for nothing other than ordinary trademark infringement. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
for unfair trade practices and false advertising should be dismissed.2
D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment
“Under New York law, to make a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege
that: (1) defendant was enriched, (2) at plaintiff's expense, and (3) equity and good conscience
militate against permitting defendant to retain what plaintiff is seeking to recover.” Leder v. Am.

2

Moreover, Plaintiff’s alleged damages of twenty five thousand dollars for his false advertising and deceptive
practices claims are facially invalid. See NYGBL § 349 (authorizing maximum of one thousand dollars and only
upon a showing of willfulness); § 350 (authorizing maximum of ten thousand dollars and only upon a showing of
willfulness).

12
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Traffic Solutions, Inc., 81 F. Supp.3d 211, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Corsello v. Verizon New
York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, 790 (2012)).
“[A]n unjust enrichment claim is not a catchall cause of action to be used when others
fail, and [should be] dismissed . . . where they are duplicative of other claims.” Leder, 81 F.
Supp.3d at 228. Rather, “[u]njust enrichment is available as a cause of action ‘only in unusual
situations when, though the defendant has not breached a contract nor committed a recognized
tort, circumstances create an equitable obligation running from the defendant to the plaintiff.’”
Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., 8 F. Supp.3d 467, 483 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (quoting Corsello, 18 N.Y.3d at 790); see also Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d
138, 144 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (equitable remedy of unjust enrichment unavailable where there is a
remedy at law for damages) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim appears to be based on Plaintiff’s allegations
that Yahoo profited from its unauthorized use of Plaintiff’s marks. Unjust enrichment claims will
be barred where they are duplicative of other related claims. See, e.g., Goldemberg, 8 F. Supp.3d
at 483 (dismissing unjust enrichment as duplicative of false advertising under N.Y. law); Koenig
v. Boulder Brands, Inc., 995 F.Supp.2d 274, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); Silva v. Smucker
Nat’l Foods, Inc., No. 14-CV-6154 (JG)(RML), 2015 WL 5360022, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2015) (dismissing unjust enrichment as duplicative of deceptive acts and practices and false
advertising under N.Y. law); see also MyPlayCity, Inc. v. Conduit Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 1615 (CM),
2012 WL 2929392, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (damages for unjust enrichment are
subsumed by damages for trademark infringement); Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F.Supp.2d
839, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (same); Town of Wallkill v. Rosenstein, 40 A.D.3d 972, 974 (2d Dep't
2007) (unjust enrichment duplicative of breach of fiduciary duty).
13
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Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails because it is entirely
duplicative of his trademark infringement and related claims. Even if it were not, there is an
adequate remedy at law available for all of Plaintiff’s alleged claims. As such, Plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment claim is merely duplicative and should be dismissed.
E. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Tortious Interference With Contract
Under New York law, tortious interference with contract requires: “(1) the existence of a
valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) defendant's knowledge of that contract,
(3) defendant's intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the contract without
justification, (4) actual breach of the contract, and (5) damages resulting therefrom.”
C=Holdings B.V. v. Asiarim Corp., 992 F.Supp.2d 223, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The Complaint does not allege the existence of any contracts. Nor does it allege
that Yahoo knew about a contract and intentionally induced the other contracting party to breach
it. As such, this claim should be dismissed.
F. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Tortious Interference With Business Relationships
To state a claim for tortious interference with business relationships a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) the plaintiff had business relations with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered
with those business relations; (3) the defendant acted for a wrongful purpose or used dishonest,
unfair, or improper means; and (4) the defendant's acts injured the relationship.” Catskill Dev.,
L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 547 F.3d 115, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).3 Additionally, “[t]he

3

The Complaint does not specifically assert tortious interference with business relationships as one if its many
causes of action, but Plaintiff makes the naked assertions that he has suffered “loss of business and personal
relationships” (Compl., ¶ 12), and “has been unable to secure additional contracts with clients,” (Compl., ¶ d). So,
for the sake of completeness, we address and dispose of that claim here.
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defendant’s interference must be direct,” and “the pleading must show that ‘but for’ [the
defendant’s] interference, [the plaintiff] would have received [a] contract.” Ritani, 880 F.Supp.2d
at 451 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As discussed above, there are no factual allegations concerning Yahoo’s state of mind.
Nor does the Complaint contain any allegations regarding third-parties with whom Plaintiff had
business relations, or that (a) Yahoo directly interfered with those relations, and (b) but for
Yahoo’s interference, Plaintiff’s business relationship would not have been injured. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference of business relations should be dismissed.
G. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty & Duty of Loyalty
The elements of a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty under New York Law are: “(i) the
existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of that duty; and (iii) damages resulting
therefrom.” Johnson v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). For a fiduciary duty to exist, there must first be a relationship through which such a
duty will be imposed. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 43
(2011) (requiring a fiduciary or confidential relationship). “A fiduciary relationship exists when
one is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the
scope of the relation.” Schwartzco Enterprises LLC v. TMH Management, 60 F. Supp.3d 331,
352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
Here, the Complaint fails to allege the existence of any fiduciary or confidential
relationship between Plaintiff and Yahoo. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even conclusorily allege that
any such relationship exists. Without such a relationship, no duty can be imposed, and neither a
fiduciary duty nor the duty of loyalty can be breached. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment § 43 (2011) (relationship prerequisite to both). Additionally, because the
15
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Complaint makes no attempt to distinguish between these two causes of action, if one fails, they
both fail. See Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d, 33,
940 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of breach of duty of loyalty claim when, as pleaded,
it “was not conceptually different from the breach of fiduciary duty claim.”). In light of the
foregoing, these claims should be dismissed.
H. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under New York law, negligent infliction of emotional distress can occur under either the
bystander or direct duty theory. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2000). Under the
bystander theory, “a defendant’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to a plaintiff and such conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the
plaintiff in consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her contemporaneous
observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted by the defendant’s conduct on a member
of the plaintiff’s immediate family in his or her presence.” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,
2001, 349 F.Supp.2d 765, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Under
the direct duty theory, a plaintiff suffers emotional distress caused by defendant’s breach of a
duty which unreasonably endangered plaintiff’s own physical safety.” Id. In both cases, “while
recovery is available for emotional injuries, there still must be an allegation that there was risk of
bodily harm to the plaintiff[].” Siben v. Amer. Airlines, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 271, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). Because Plaintiff made no allegations of risk of bodily harm, this claim should be
dismissed.
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I. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under New York law, intentional infliction of emotional distress requires “(1) an extreme
and outrageous act by the defendant, (2) intent by the defendant to inflict severe emotional
distress, (3) resulting in severe emotional distress, (4) and that the distress be caused by the
defendant's conduct.” Siben, 913 F. Supp. at 279. The defendant’s conduct must be “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Martin v.
Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 1985).
No extreme and outrageous conduct by Yahoo (or anyone else) is alleged. Nor has
Plaintiff alleged that Yahoo intended to inflict severe emotion distress upon him. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed.
J. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Unlawful Trespass
An alleged trespass to something other than real property is treated as a claim for trespass
to chattels. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation, 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (applying New York law). “To state a claim for trespass to chattels under New York law,
plaintiffs must establish that defendants intentionally, and without justification or consent,
physically interfered with the use and enjoyment of personal property in plaintiff’s possession
and that plaintiffs were thereby harmed.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
Recovery for trespass is improper where the defendant's alleged trespass was not a
proximate or substantial cause of the plaintiff’s damages. See In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d at 126 (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of trespass and other
17
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intentional torts for failing to allege that they proximately caused the injuries). “Under New York
law, liability only obtains on this cause of action if a defendant causes harm to the owner's
materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the
owner is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time.” In re JetBlue Airways Corp.
Privacy Litigation, 379 F.Supp.2d at 328 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
Here Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of any chattel with which Plaintiff claims
Yahoo has interfered, much less that Yahoo has caused any harm to Plaintiff’s interest in the
physical condition, quality, or value of any chattel, or has deprived Plaintiff of the use of any
chattel for a substantial period of time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful trespass
should be dismissed.
K. In Addition to Being Barred Under the CDA, Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for
Civil RICO
“The RICO provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 were enacted
expressly, as set forth in the preamble to the Act, ‘to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States.’” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing Pub.L. No. 91-452 (1970)). “Although essentially a criminal statute, RICO
provides for civil penalties by private parties who have been injured ‘by reason of’ a RICO
violation.” Id. at 654-655 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 164(c)). “In particular, the statute makes it
unlawful for any person to (a) use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest
in an enterprise, (b) acquire control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,
(c) conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,
or (d) conspire to do any of those things.” Id. at 655 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d)).
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In order to state a claim under RICO, the defendant must be alleged to have committed at
least two predicate acts constituting racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Katzman,
167 F.R.D. at 655; Baldino’s Lock & Key Service, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 88 F. Supp.3d 543, 550
(E.D. Va. 2015). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege that Yahoo has committed any such
predicate acts, much less engaged in any pattern of racketeering activity as required under the
RICO statute. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Civil RICO claim should be dismissed.
V.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Yahoo respectfully submits that its Motion to Dismiss be

granted in its entirety and that Plaintiff’s claims against Yahoo be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated May 12, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
/s/ Jeremy A. Schachter
Jeremy A. Schachter (JS 2181)
The Grace Building
1114 Avenue of the Americas
21st Floor
New York, New York 10036
Telephone: (212) 775-8750
jschachter@kilpatricktownsend.com
Dennis Wilson (admitted hac vice)
Caroline Barbee (admitted pro hac vice)
9720 Wilshire Blvd PH
Beverly Hills, California 90212
Telephone: (310) 777-3740
dwilson@kilpatricktownsend.com
cbarbee@kilpatricktownsend.com
Attorneys for Defendant Yahoo Inc.
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MANCHANDA LAW OFFICE PLLC
30 Wall Street, 8th Floor
New York, New York 10005
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/s/ Jeremy A. Schachter
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